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Comments and Casenotes
ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISHONOR OF
BANK CHECK-DAMAGES
Magness v. Equitable Trust Co. 1
The appellant, a depositor, brought an action of tort
against the defendant bank alleging the wiqongful dishonor of checks drawn by the appellant. The usual practice of the bank, when checks were presented for payment, was to examine the drawer's account as it appeared
on the books at the close of the preceding day. For several
years the appellant had been anticipating credit at the
bank by issuing checks and making subsequent deposits
to cover them. The bank had agreed with the appellant
to search the deposits of the current day before dishonoring his checks. A service charge was made for this investigation. The bank, after a previous warning, notified the depositor that this additional service would be
discontinued on April 12, 1937. The appellant then assured
the bank that his deposits would be made more promptly
and that he would straighten out his account. The bank
then continued to furnish the special service until the
appellant's account was closed, which was sometime subsequent to May 7, 1937.
The appellant alleged that the defendant had negligently failed to pay six checks drawn by the appellant,
although the bank had sufficient money of the appellant's
to pay the checks when presented. The appellant was
only able to show covering deposits for two of these checks.
Both were issued at night, on April 15, 1937 and on April
30, 1937. The covering deposit for one check was made
in a night deposit box shortly after its issue. The covering deposit for the second check was not made until noon
of the day following its issue. Both checks were presented
the day after issue, both were dishonored and returned
to the holder, who presented them again several days later,
at which time they were paid. There was no evidence as
to the time of day when the checks were presented, nor
was there any evidence of injury to the depositor. In
1

176 Md. 528, 6 A. (2d) 241 (1939).
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the absence of a showing that a covering deposit was made
before presentment of the second check, any liability of
the defendant bank had to be based on the dishonor of
the first check, for which the covering deposit was made
during the night preceding its presentment. The plaintiffappellant-depositor was a physician, and the checks were
drawn in favor of a pharmacy where he purchased medical supplies. Both of the checks in question were drawn
for $175. The appellant used the proceeds to pay small
bills which he owed the pharmacy, the balance of the
money was used to make up the greater portion of the
covering deposit. The pharmacist who was the holder of
the checks testified that there had been no change in his
relations with the doctor as a result of the defendant's
refusal to pay the checks. The lower court directed a
verdict for the defendant. On appeal, Held: Affirmed.
The liability of a bank to a depositor for the wrongful dishonor of the latter's checks is well established. The
courts have consistently followed the rule announced in
Marzetti v. Williams2 and Rolin v. Steward' to the effect
that although the action is founded on the contract implied
between the bank and the depositor, an action of tort will
lie. The contract between the parties creates a duty on
the bank to pay the depositor's checks, provided the depositor has sufficient funds to his credit. For the wrongful dishonor of a check, the depositor may sue for the
breach of the banking contract or he may sue in tort for
the breach of his legal right which arose from the contract.4 The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that the
duties and rights of the parties depend on the contract ordinarily implied in banking relations, with any modification which the parties might make. The usual banking
contract requires that deposits covering outstanding checks
be made no later than the close of the business day preceding presentment of the check.
If the defendant bank had followed this custom and
had refused to furnish the special service to the appellant,
it could not be contended that the bank had acted unreasonably or negligently in dishonoring the checks in question. Consequently the liability of the bank depends solely
on the existence of the alleged agreement by the bank
to search and credit covering deposits made during the
1 B. & D. 415, 109 Eng. Repr. 842 (1830).
214 C. B. 594, 139 Eng. Repr. 245 (1854).
'7 Am. Jur. 537, 9 C. J. S. 360, and cases there cited.
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current day. In affirming the judgment for the bank, the
Court held that there was no evidence of a special agreement after April 12, 1937 and that the bank had continued
the searching "only on sufferance, in the continuing expectation of being relieved of the problem."
An examination of the transcript of the record in the
instant case supports the Court's conclusion that when the
checks were dishonored there was no longer any contract
which bound the bank to search for appellant's deposits.
At most, all that can be said is that there was an offer
by the depositor to a series of unilateral contracts. However, in the absence of any binding contract, the bank
did continue to furnish the special service until the appellant closed his account and to charge the account for this
service. It might possibly be argued that the bank's conduct amounted to a representation on which appellant relied to his damage. The Court, in its opinion, did not mention the possibility of an estoppel, and properly so. The
presence of the bare requisites of the doctrine of estoppel
does not, ipso facto, justify the application of the principle. Since the bank had warned the appellant twice that
the "original arrangement" was to be discontinued, it
could not be seriously contended that the appellant was
justified in relying on any such representations which the
bank might be said to have made. To have held the bank
to be estopped to deny liability would tend to encourage
the unsound business practices of which appellant was
guilty and to restrict the freedom of a bank to furnish
such special services to its depositors. In all respects, the
result reached by the Court of Appeals seems sound and
in complete accord with the authorities.
The opinion in the instant case is very brief. However, it does suggest an interesting question: Assuming
the liability of the defendant, what would be the proper
measure of damages? When cases involving wrongful dishonor of checks have been presented to the courts, the
question of damages has been the most controversial and
has invoked the greatest discussion. The difficulty arises
because the nature of such cases renders it unlikely that
the plaintiff can furnish distinct proof of any actual damage. Yet where such a wrong is committed, some injury
naturally results. The dishonor of his check hurts a depositor's credit and undoubtedly reflects on his reputation,
particularly in the business world. In this respect some
authorities have drawn an analogy between cases of wrong-
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ful dishonor and actions for defamation per se.5 Whether
the action is brought in tort or contract the plaintiff is
entitled to recover nominal damages, at least, which the
law presumes from the wrongful act of the defendant.
A plaintiff is entitled only to such damages as are definitely proved with reasonable certainty to have resulted
as a natural, proximate and direct effect of the tort or
breach of contract.0
The problem arises when the plaintiff's right to recover substantial damages, without proof thereof, is considered. The English view restricts the right to cases in
which the plaintiff is a merchant or trader. A great number of the American authorities support the distinction
drawn between traders and non-traders.' The basis of the
rule seems to be that if the plaintiff is not a merchant
the wrongful dishonor of his check may only possibly injure him and if so, he can recover for the damages proved.
Whereas, if a merchant's check is dishonored, the Courts
feel that an especial injury inevitably results. The rule
has been much criticized and many courts have refused
to recognize the distinction. A leading case taking this
position is Woody v. National Bank of Rocky Mount,8
which points out that "the conditions upon which the distinction was founded no longer prevail." In the modern
world the use of bank checks in financial transactions is
far wider than in the early nineteenth century when the
English Courts developed the rule. Today people from
all walks of life are bank depositors and make use of
checks. Non-traders are just as susceptible to injury, when
a check is wrongfully dishonored, as traders, although it
is conceded the injury is more likely to be of a moral,
rather than a pecuniary nature.
If a Court adopts the trader distinction, the question
which it must then face is, what category does the plaintiff fall in? The appellant in the Magness case relied
heavily on the case of Columbia National Bank v. MacKnight' which held that a physician was a "trader" within the meaning of the rule and therefor entitled to substantial damages. The emphasis on this case shows an im12 M RSE BANKS & BANKING (6th Ed.) Sec. 458.

'Tidewater Oil Co. v. Spoerer, 145 Md. 151, 125 A. 601 (1924).
*4
A. L. R. 954, 13 A. L. R. 305, 34 A. L. R. 205, 58 A. L. R. 732, 15
L. R. A. 134, 18 Am. St. Rep. 865, and cases there noted.
* 194 N. C. 549, 140 S. E. 150 (1927).
129 App. D. C. 580 (1907).
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plicit recognition of the trader distinction as the law. The
defendant bank argued that since the plaintiff-appellantdoctor was not a "trader" and could prove no injury, there
could be no recovery in any event. Yet in the case of
State Bank v. Marshall,° it was held that a keeper of a
public boarding house was not a trader. The uncertainty
in the application of the rule lends weight to the Woody
case and others which repudiate the distinction.
A third view on the question is the one commonly
known as the "New York rule."" This line of cases does
not recognize the trader rule but reaches a result diametrically opposed to the result in the Woody case. In
the latter, the Court held that regardless of the plaintiff's economic characteristics, the jury may "give such
temperate damages as they conceive to be a reasonable
compensation for that indefinite mischief which such an
act must be assumed to have inflicted." The "New York
rule" is that the damages recoverable should be restricted
to those actually proved. Such a principle has been criticized on the ground that it would be against the interest of the public to place banks in the position where they
could dishonor checks wrongfully with comparative impunity. 2 This criticism seems to be of little merit. Banks
are quasi-public institutions, yet they operate in competition with other banks. The wrongful dishonor of a check
is seldom wilful, but it is the result of an innocent mistake which the banks try to avoid. To be sure, a legal
right of the depositor has been breached, but in a case
such as the Magness case where there was no change in the
relations of the depositor with the payee-holder of the
check and where no actual damage is shown, does it not
unduly penalize the bank to award the plaintiff substantial
damages? Moreover, the depositors are protected by the
general principle which is embodied in all the various
views as to the measure of damages, that where the tort
or breach of contract is the result of fraud, malice or gross
negligence, exemplary damages may be given.
It is submitted that the "New York rule" is the preferable view. It ignores the now unfounded distinction between traders and non-traders, it awards the depositor
10 163 Ark. 566, 260 S. W. 431 (1924).
IT. B. Clark Co. v. Mt. Morris Bank, 181 N. Y. 533, 73 N. E. 1133
(1905) ; Spiegel v. Public National Bank, 184 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1920).
12Patterson v. Marine National Bank, 130 Pa. 419, 18 A. 632, 17 Am.
St. Rep. 778 (1889).
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substantial damages when there is proof of an injury over
and above the breach of a technical legal right and it only
imposes a penalty on the bank where such penalty is deserved, i. e. where the bank acts maliciously or fraudulently. This rule has been adopted by statute in several
jurisdictions, among which are Alabama, North Carolina
and Pennsylvania. 3

VALIDITY, INTERPRETATION, AND PROBATE
OF FOREIGN WILLS
Rabe v. McAllister'
Testatrix executed her first will while living in Baltimore in 1927, leaving all her property to H. The same
year, she went to Germany, where in 1933 she made a
holographic will leaving all her property, except a church
bequest, to R. In 1935, in Germany, she made a third
will, also holographic, which consisted of an express revocation of the 1933 will, and a direction that her heirs should
keep the family vault in Germany in order. After testatrix's death in Germany, in 1937, the first will was admitted to probate in Baltimore on December 1st, 1937,
and defendant was appointed administrator c. t. a. on renunciation of the executrix. Meanwhile, the two other
wills had been probated in Germany, and copies were filed
in Baltimore on August 25th, 1938. On November 20th
this petition was filed by plaintiff heir-at-law, praying that
probate of the first will be revoked, with the letters thereon to the defendant; that the third (1935) will be declared
operative, and that letters thereon be granted plaintiff's
attorney. Assets consisted of $4000 in Germany and $25,
000 in a Baltimore bank. Held: Petition dismissed. The
Court's decision was based on the theory of revival of the
first will by the revocation of the second, with no revocatory conflict between the first and third wills.
The case contains a concise but thorough review of
Maryland law on the methods of revocation of wills, and
189 C. J. S. 365, note 45.

18 A. (2d) 922 (Md. 1939).

